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 Manager fairness matters to employees and has important work outcomes.  The current 
research explored whether differences exist in the rate of revision (change) of first impressions of 
a manager’s interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness.  After observing impression-
inconsistent information, participants’ initial impressions of interactional fairness/unfairness 
were hypothesized to exhibit greater amounts of impression revision than impressions of 
procedural fairness/unfairness.  A 2 (fairness type: interactional vs. procedural) x 2 (initial 
behaviour: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (time of rating: initial vs. revised) experimental design involving 
165 participants was implemented.  Results show that the rate of change in ratings of 
interactional fairness over time was significantly greater than the rate of change in ratings of 
procedural fairness in the unfair initial-impression condition, as predicted.  This was not true for 
the fair initial-impression condition.  Unexpectedly, first impressions of fairness in general did 
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 The fairness of authority figures in the workplace has blossomed in popularity as a research 
topic over the past 30 years (e.g., Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, 2001; Barling & 
Phillips, 1993; Lind, Kray & Thompson, 2001).  One well-established principle in the justice 
literature is that fairness – or justice – in organizations is important to employees.  This is 
illustrated by the fact that these impressions have critical outcomes on employee work 
behaviours.  For example, holding the impression that one’s manager at work is unfair has 
critical outcomes on the employee, such as antisocial behaviour (Greenberg, 1997), work stress 
and disobedience (Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996), and turnover (Alexander & Ruderman, 
1987). 
In contrast, impressions of manager fairness at work results in increased commitment and 
job satisfaction (Folger & Konovsky, 1989), organizational citizenship behaviours (Folger & 
Cropanzano, 1998), and job performance on the part of employees (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 
2001).  Does an employee’s impression of manager fairness change over the course of their 
relationship, or is it more stable in nature?  This is a question that is yet to be addressed by 
research.   
 The justice literature has demonstrated that there are three ways in which employees 
think about and evaluate fairness in organizations.  There is distributive fairness, which refers to 
the allocation of material resources.  Procedural fairness pertains to the appropriateness of the 
processes used to determine the allocation of resources.  Finally, interactional fairness is the 
quality of interpersonal treatment given when communicating outcomes.  Recently, researchers 
have come to understand interactional fairness as its own separate type (e.g., Barling & Phillips, 
1993; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).  The current research takes the same stance on this matter, as 
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much evidence corroborates this position.  For example, the three types of fairness are associated 
with different classes of dependent variables (Bies, 2001; Colquitt, 2001).  Distributive fairness 
is strongly associated with evaluations of the allocation of material resources (e.g., pay 
satisfaction).  Procedural fairness is associated with evaluations of the processes by which 
allocation decisions are made, and are reflected in attitudes toward the organization such as 
commitment (e.g., Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993).  Finally, interactional fairness is strongly 
associated with evaluations of the interpersonal behaviour of authority figures (Bies, 2001).  
Interactional fairness affects employee trust in authorities, and perceptions of leader–member 
exchange (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). 
 The current research focuses on procedural and interactional fairness.  Managers typically 
have more control over these two perceptions, whereas they often have less control over aspects 
of distributive fairness.  Another important reason for focusing on procedural and interactional 
fairness is that, based on our theory, we have differing expectations for the way that people’s 
impressions of these two types of fairness are revised.  Indeed, the impression revision processes 
likely differ from one type of fairness to another.   
 Substantial strides have been made in the broader social psychology literature regarding 
impression revision.  The organizational fairness literature is a burgeoning one as well.  
Nevertheless, many topics of research in these areas are yet to be broached.  In general, there is a 
dearth in the literature about how people form impressions of the fairness of their managers at 
work, and how those impressions change over the course of time.  Do first impressions of 
manager fairness hold up in the face of impression-inconsistent information?  If impression 
revision occurs, what is the process by which it is carried out?  These questions are yet to be 
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addressed in both the impression revision and organizational fairness literatures.  The current 
research seeks to bridge the two literatures to provide some initial answers. 
Impression Revision 
 There is an underlying organization in people’s implicit theories of personality (Asch, 
1946; Asch & Zukier, 1984).  We are not passive or random perceivers of others’ behaviours.  A 
plethora of evidence suggests that people have a proclivity toward forming initial impressions of 
other people’s traits even when in contact with them for a very brief period of time – as little as 
30 seconds (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992).  These impressions are heuristics that help us make 
sense of the world around us.  It is apparent, then, that the formation of first impressions is 
relevant in everyday life.    
 Evidence exists to support the fact that impression revision occurs, as well.  Once a 
perceiver forms an impression regarding a particular trait of some actor, there are expectations 
for particular patterns of behaviour for that person, within that trait domain (Reeder & Coovert, 
1986).  If that person’s actual behaviour violates the perceiver’s expectations, a process of 
impression change, or revision, is set into motion (Ybarra, 2001).  This violating information 
often causes the perceiver to make adjustments to update the relevant impression.  A study by 
Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie and Milberg (1987) demonstrated that perceivers use a continuum for 
impression revision of personality traits, whereby impression-inconsistent information can result 
in adjustments to the already existing impression.  In summary, evidence supports that first 
impressions are important, but also that a process of impression revision can take place.  In order 
to better understand the nature of our impressions, the current research will explore which of 
these two – first impressions or impression revision – play a larger role when the impressions 
pertain to the fairness of a manager. 
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 The impression revision research has demonstrated that the impressions we form of 
various traits differ in stability depending on the underlying trait domain that the impression is 
based on (Ybarra, 2001; Reeder & Brewer, 1979).  One reason for this is that perceivers apply 
different inferential rules to others’ behaviours depending on the trait domain that the particular 
behaviour seems to be expressing.  Generally speaking, the type of trait that an impression is 
based on, matters to the perceiver.   
 For example, imagine witnessing your co-worker of five years, Ben, stealing money out 
of a colleague’s purse.  Even if you have never observed any dishonest behaviour by Ben before, 
seeing him steal will undoubtedly impact your impression of how honest a person he is.  Just like 
that, with a single “negative behaviour” in the honesty trait domain, you likely perceive Ben as 
dishonest.  Or, imagine that your co-worker, Bill, asks you to edit his paper that he wishes to 
submit for publication.  You have read all of Bill’s previous papers, and their quality is always 
most excellent.  This paper, however, is very poor.  A similar question as above is, will this 
single demonstration of a “negative behaviour” in the paper-writing ability trait domain change 
your impression of Bill’s skillfulness in writing?  Perhaps it will, to some extent.  Will this 
impression change as much as your honesty impression of Ben changed when he demonstrated 
the single “negative behaviour” in the honesty trait domain?  Probably not, because you have 
observed Bill’s impeccable writing in the past and know that he is capable of brilliant work.  Bill 
received the benefit of the doubt.  Ben, on the other hand, did not.   
 The goal of the current research is to explore whether differences exist in the rate of 
revision of first impressions of a manager’s interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness.  
Does impression revision always occur when we witness an actor perform behaviour that is 
incompatible with our already existing impressions of him or her?  It critically depends on the 
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particular trait domain that the behaviour is expressing.  Our theory includes two important trait 
domains, which we turn to next. 
Morality and Competence 
 Morality and competence are two predominant trait domains that underlie most 
impressions and social judgments (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, 
Yzerbyt & Kashima, 2005).  Morality refers to traits that are relevant to considerate interpersonal 
treatment in relationships, such as friendliness, sincerity, honesty, and respect.  Competence 
refers to traits that are relevant to task accomplishment and achievement, such as intelligence, 
mathematical proficiency, and general skillfulness.  To connect these trait domains with the 
aforementioned examples, honesty falls within the morality domain, and paper-writing ability 
falls within the competence domain.  These two trait domains are important in the current 
research because our theory maintains that they are uniquely related to interactional and 
procedural fairness.   
Diagnosticity 
Morality and competence differ in their respective levels of an important dimension 
called diagnosticity.  The diagnosticity of an observed behaviour refers to how demonstrative or 
representative it is of the actor’s actual, underlying trait.  What is being “diagnosed” is the 
actor’s true personality trait.   
Diagnosticity played a major role in several studies (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986a; Kunda & 
Nisbett, 1986b) that explored people’s impressions of the competence and morality traits in 
others.  Participants estimated the cross-situational consistency of morality-related or 
competence-related behaviours.  First, information was provided about a person’s past morality 
behaviour or competence behaviour.  For example, “Jane was honest when telling her husband 
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that she had been fired.”  Then, participants were asked to estimate the probability that this 
person would behave similarly in the same domain in the future.  Specifically, they estimated the 
probability that the actor would maintain his or her relative ranking within the relevant peer 
group.  Results showed that when predicting the consistency of competence-related behaviours, 
participants’ estimates were very accurate.  Their estimates were similar to the actual cross-
situational consistency of the trait, which was acquired by the researchers.  For morality 
behaviours, the participants’ estimates were very inaccurate.  The participants significantly 
underestimated the cross-situational consistency of morality behaviours.  The results demonstrate 
not only inaccuracy, but also a lack of confidence when estimating the consistency of morality 
behaviours.  Conversely, the estimates of the cross-situational consistency of competence 
behaviours were highly accurate. 
Understanding diagnosticity helps to explain these results.  Competence behaviours 
consist of skill-based traits that have objective and measureable units, such as scores and 
percentiles.  This is why there is a high level of diagnosticity in competence behaviours.  The 
fact that the information is extremely quantitative makes it very meaningful to the perceiver.  It 
makes interpretation – or diagnosis – of the actor’s underlying traits tremendously easier.  That is 
why participants in the Kunda and Nisbett study (1986a) were more accurate in estimating the 
actual consistency of these traits.  If a person scores in the 99
th
 percentile of the LSAT or MCAT, 
for example, we believe that he or she is very intelligent and will continue to demonstrate 
intelligent behaviour in the future.  This is because the information is so objective.  We have a 
lucid understanding of what it means to score in the 99
th
 percentile of a standardized 
examination.  Therefore, knowing about this test score conveys meaningful information about 
the person’s underlying intelligence trait. 
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 The diagnosticity of morality behaviours, on the other hand, is low.  These behaviours, 
which represent such traits as friendliness and honesty, have no obvious or interpretable units of 
measurement, and no well-defined method of assigning scores to behaviours.  Just how much 
friendliness is there in a smile?  Surely, it is difficult to articulate.  In a study by Kunda and 
Nisbett (1986a), people were not only demonstrably poor perceivers of the consistency of 
morality behaviours, but they were also very unsure about their estimates.  Thus, we have 
difficulty determining just how representative an actor’s morality-related behaviour is of his or 
her relevant underlying morality traits.  To reiterate, the diagnosticity of morality behaviours is 
low.  The research by Kunda and Nisbett (1986a; 1986b) makes it clear that people believe that 
others will continue to act the way they do in the future for competence behaviours, but not 
necessarily for morality behaviours.  
Maintenance 
Maintenance is another dimension on which the morality and competence trait domains 
differ.  Maintenance refers to the consistency of positive behaviour that is required in order for 
an observer to maintain an already-existing positive impression of an actor’s trait.  Morality traits 
are high in maintenance (Ybarra, 2001).  This means that any negative behaviour that is 
witnessed by an observer in the morality domain will cause severe changes to an observer’s 
initially positive impression of that trait.  High maintenance of a trait results in a high degree of 
behavioural consistency that is required by an actor in order for an observer to maintain the 
initially positive impression.  This was illustrated by the example of Ben stealing money, and the 
ensuing impact on our impression of his honesty.  It didn’t matter that you had known Ben for 
five years and never witnessed any dishonest behaviour.  The one negative behaviour of stealing 
was enough to drastically alter one’s impression of how honest a person he is. 
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 Competence traits, on the contrary, are low in maintenance (Ybarra, 2001).  This means 
that negative behaviour that is witnessed by an observer is much less damaging to an initially 
positive impression of the trait.  The low maintenance of competence traits results in a lower 
degree of behavioural consistency that is required by an actor in order for an observer to 
maintain an initially positive impression.  This was illustrated in the example of Bill’s poorly 
written paper, and our subsequent leniency and willingness to preserve the positive impression of 
his paper-writing ability. 
 Maintenance is a product of diagnosticity, and the two constructs share an inverse 
relationship.  The low diagnosticity of morality behaviours means that observers are unsure 
about how representative any positive behaviour in this domain is of the actor’s underlying 
personality trait.  This results in the higher behavioural consistency requirement on the part of 
the actor in order for an initially positive impression to be maintained.  Thus, low diagnosticity 
leads to the high maintenance for Morality behaviours.   
On the other hand, the high diagnosticity of competence behaviours means observers are 
more accurate and confident about how representative positive behaviour is of the actor’s 
underlying traits.  These traits are more easily quantified and interpretable.  Consequently, 
observers will interpret an actor’s single behavioural demonstration of high performance in a 
competence-related behaviour as proof of high ability in that trait domain.  Once proven, less 
behavioural consistency is then required by the actor in this domain in order for an observer to 
maintain the initially positive impression of the trait.  That is, there is more “wiggle room” for 
negative behaviours before an initially positive impression is subject to revision for competence 
traits.  Again, the high diagnosticity leads to low maintenance for competence behaviours. 
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 Further support for these findings come from previous research that shows that even a 
single negative behaviour in the morality domain can lead an observer to drastically revise their 
initially-positive impressions of an actor (Kammrath et al, 2007).  In the competence trait 
domain, conversely, a single negative behaviour does not have such a dire effect on the overall 
impression.   
 Take the morality trait of patience, for example.  Imagine that it is your first week at a 
new job, and you hold the first impression that your manager is patient because she has been 
patient with you thus far.  Suddenly, after only a few days on the job, she blows up at you 
unexpectedly for being too slow in finishing a small project.  That single negative morality-
related behaviour will stick with you, even if it is an aberration from her normal behaviour.  In 
the face of this impression-inconsistent information, your already existing positive morality-
based first impression of how patient she is will change markedly.  In other words, the morality 
impression will undergo considerable impression revision.    
 Suppose now that you hire a piano player for a dinner party you are having.  This pianist 
performed wonderfully when you hired her for your last party, so you hold the impression that 
she is a highly skilled player.  At this party, however, she performs poorly and is noticeably off 
tune.  Since piano playing ability is a competence trait, you will still hold the impression that the 
piano player is talented, because of your past experience witnessing her tremendous piano 
playing behaviour, even if it was just one time.  In the face of the impression-inconsistent 
information of her poor playing at your most recent party, your positive competence-based first 
impression is essentially maintained.  In other words, the competence impression does not 
undergo very much impression revision.  In summary, positive first impressions of competence-
10 
 
based traits are more resistant to impression revision than are positive first impressions of 
morality-based traits.   
A number of studies provide support for the finding that first impressions of morality-
based traits are more prone revision in the face of impression-inconsistent information, as 
compared to first impressions of competence-based traits.  One of these studies was carried out 
by Kammrath, Ames, and Scholer (2007).  In one of their experiments, participants formed initial 
impressions of positive morality-based traits or positive competence-based traits of an actor for 
whom they were given behavioural information.  Then participants observed a mixture of both 
impression-consistent and impression-inconsistent behavioural information about the actor in 
that same domain.  Results supported the finding that morality-based impressions were more 
easily subjected to impression revision than competence-based impressions. 
 The research that has been discussed up to this point has explored how positive first 
impressions of morality and competence traits are revised when impression-inconsistent 
behaviour is observed.  A shortcoming of this collective research is that it has only explored 
initial impressions that are positive.  But there is another, separate stream of research that 
compares positive and negative impressions more generally, and without the distinction of trait 
domains such as morality and competence.  Generally, results show that positive first 
impressions are more easily revised than negative first impressions (Lind, Kray & Thompson, 
2001, Ybarra, 2001).   
 A general finding in psychology is that more weight is usually placed on negative 
information as compared to positive information.  When forming impressions, for example, 
observers typically place greater weight on negative information than on positive information 
(Birnbaum, 1973; Hamilton & Zanna, 1972).  A study by Briscoe et al. (1967) showed that 
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impressions underwent greater change following the observation of inconsistent negative 
behaviour rather than inconsistent positive behaviour.  These findings are significant because 
they examined negative first impressions in addition to positive ones.   No research has ever 
examined first impressions of morality and competence that were negative.  Therefore, much 
research remains to be carried out in the impression revision literature.  The current research 
aims to explore this research opportunity, and to bridge the gap between the impression revision 
and organizational fairness literatures. 
Theoretical Postulations 
How do the different ways of thinking about organizational fairness relate to the morality 
and competence trait domains?  We propose a conceptual framework that connects the 
organizational fairness and impression revision literatures.  As noted earlier, interactional 
fairness refers to people’s perceptions of the quality of the interpersonal treatment that they 
receive from authority figures that enact procedures (Bies & Moag, 1986).  One core element of 
such perceptions is the degree to which people are treated with warmth, politeness, dignity and 
respect by authorities.  Interactional fairness works primarily to alter reactions to decision 
outcomes, because sensitivity on the part of the manager can make employees feel better about 
an unfavourable outcome (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Holmvall & Bobocel, 2008).  Since interactional 
fairness perceptions are rooted in warm, respectful, and dignified interpersonal treatment, our 
theory holds that interactional fairness can be conceptualized as falling within the morality 
domain. 
 Procedural fairness refers to evaluations of the processes that are used to determine 
outcome distributions or allocations (Colquitt et al., 2001).  Lind and Tyler (1988) brought the 
concept of procedural justice out of the legal field and into the organizational setting.  Procedural 
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fairness, according to Leventhal (1976), meant that organizational procedures should a) be 
applied consistently, b) be free from bias c) be free of vested interests, d) ensure that accurate 
information is collected and used in making decisions, e) have some policy for correcting flawed 
decisions, f) conform to prevailing standards of morality, and g) ensure that the opinions of 
groups affected by the decision have been taken into account.  Employees are willing to 
relinquish control over decision-making as long as they have some process-related influence 
(Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  Since ensuring procedural fairness involves a set of 
concrete skills aimed at being consistent, accurate, and unbiased when making decisions about 
people, our theory holds that it can be conceptualized as falling within the competence domain.  
This postulation, together with the aforementioned one – that interactional fairness can be 
conceptualized as falling within the morality domain – comprises the backbone of our theory. 
 Our theoretical reasoning is as follows regarding all first impressions, both positive and 
negative.  We know that morality impressions are more prone to revision than those of 
competence.  Our theory holds that interactional fairness falls within this morality domain.  We 
also know that competence impressions are more resistant to revision, and our theory holds that 
procedural fairness falls within this competence domain.  Therefore, it is expected that 
interactional fairness impressions, as compared to those of procedural fairness, will show more 
revision when an observer witnesses impression-inconsistent behaviour.  This line of reasoning 
is based on research that examined positive first impressions only.  As stated earlier, no research 
has ever examined how first impressions of the fairness – or unfairness – of a manager is or is 
not revised in the face of impression-inconsistent information.  The current research will be the 
first to delve into the world of a particular type of negative first impressions – those of unfairness 
– which will be explored in addition to first impressions of fairness.   
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Hypothesis 1: After observing impression-inconsistent behaviour, initial impressions of 
interactional fairness/unfairness will exhibit more revision than initial impressions of 
procedural fairness/unfairness. 
 Figure 1 and Figure 2 are theoretical depictions of the expected patterns of data for 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, respectively. 
 As stated previously, there has also been a plethora of research to suggest that, generally 
speaking, negative first impressions are more resistant to revision than positive first impressions 
(Kammrath, Ames & Scholer, 2007; Lind, Kray & Thompson, 2001).  At the heart of the issue 
here is the fact that negative information about others is weighted more heavily in impressions 
than positive information (Ybarra, 2001; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001).  
Based on this finding, we expect a main effect of negativity, such that first impressions of 
unfairness will exhibit less revision than first impressions of fairness, regardless of the type of 
fairness. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: After observing impression-inconsistent behaviour, first impressions of 
fairness will exhibit more revision than first impressions of unfairness (regardless of 
fairness type).  




Pilot Study 1 
 Several tasks needed to be completed in order for this research to be carried out.  First, 
there was a need for a number of examples of manager behaviours that were representative of 
interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness.  In order to achieve this, 36 items of manager 
behaviour were created.  These items were derived from the definitions of these constructs in the 
literature.  After reading the definitions of interactional and procedural fairness, participants 
rated each item on its level of both types of fairness.  The items that best represented each type of 
fairness were selected for potential use in the main study. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-one undergraduate students (20 women and 11 men) at the University of Waterloo 
participated in this study for course credit.  Participants were recruited through the Psychology 
Department’s research participant pool.  
Materials  
 Thirty-six episodes of manager behaviour were generated.  Each item was designed to 
uniquely reflect the definitions of either procedural or interactional fairness or unfairness from 
the organizational fairness literature (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt et. al., 2001).  Eighteen 
interactional fairness items (10 positive, 8 negative) and 18 procedural fairness items (10 
positive, 8 negative) were generated.   
 An example of an interactional fairness item was, “H.G. was sincere when breaking the 
news to a young employee that the employee was being demoted.”  An example of a procedural 




Participants first read the definition of interactional fairness.  Next, they read each of the 
36 items and provided a rating of interactional fairness for each one.  Participants were told that 
the episodes they were reading were examples of real behaviours of managers from 
organizational records.  Ratings were provided on a likert scale, from -3 to 3 (-3 = Extremely 
Interactionally Unfair, 3 = Extremely Interactionally Fair).  Next, the definition for procedural 
fairness was provided.  Participants then re-read the same 36 managerial behaviours and 
provided a procedural fairness rating for each one.  In the end, then, participants had provided 
ratings of both interactional and procedural fairness for all items.  The participants were 
counterbalanced such that half provided ratings of interactional fairness first, while the other half 
provided procedural fairness ratings first. 
Obtaining ratings of both types of fairness for each item was essential in determining 
which items were most representative of their intended type of fairness.  Of all of the items, we 
were able to determine which ones were actually perceived to be reflective of the fairness type 
that they were created to reflect.  This paradigm enabled us to examine, for instance, the 
procedural fairness items that were rated as highly procedurally fair while being rated more 
neutrally in interactional fairness.  This would be an ideally representative procedural fairness 
item, since it was only being rated consistently high in the type of fairness that it was created to 
reflect.   
An item was only considered for inclusion in the main study if certain criteria were met.  
First, the item had to exhibit a more extreme mean rating in the appropriate direction for the 
intended fairness type (the type from which the item was created) than for the unintended 
fairness type.  The mean rating for an interactional unfairness item, for example, should have had 
a significantly more negative mean rating on interactional fairness than procedural fairness.  
16 
 
Second, the item needed to show a mean rating that was relatively neutral (between -1.5 And 
1.5) on the unintended type of fairness.  Third, a t-test needed to show a significant difference 
between the mean ratings in each type of fairness for the item.   
Results 
 The results are shown in Table 1.  All in all, 27 of the 36 items met the criteria listed 
above.  For seven of these items, the differences in the t-test were marginal.  In order to further 
narrow down the number of items to be used in the main study, another study was carried out, 
which we turn to next. 
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Pilot Study 2 
 The purpose of the second pilot study was twofold.  First, valence ratings for each of the 
36 items of manager behaviour were obtained.  These ratings were desired in light of evidence in 
the literature that morality behaviours generally elicit stronger impressions in observers than do 
competence behaviours (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002).  Due to their theorized links with 
interactional and procedural fairness, respectively, it is plausible that the valence ratings of 
interactional fairness would be more extreme than the valence ratings of procedural fairness.  If 
this were found to be true, one could argue that valence is responsible for why interactional 
fairness impressions might show more revision than procedural fairness impressions; 
interactional impressions were rated more extremely to begin with, and so they would have 
farther to fall.  In any case, it will be useful to control for valence when comparing the amounts 
of impression revision among participants in the main study. 
 The second purpose of this pilot study was to empirically test our theoretical postulations 
that interactional fairness maps onto the morality trait domain, and that procedural fairness maps 
onto the competence trait domain.  In order to test this, participants carried out a Q-sort task in 
which they read the same 36 items and sorted each one into what they perceived to be the most 
appropriate trait domain.  
Method 
Participants and design   
A new sample of 30 undergraduate students (20 women and 10 men) at the University of 
Waterloo participated in this experiment for course credit.  Participants were recruited through 
the Psychology Department’s research participant pool.  
Materials and Procedure 
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The same 36 examples of manager behaviour that were used in pilot study 1 were used in 
this study.  The participants first carried out the valence task.  They read each item and provided 
a rating of its “positivity or negativity.”  The ratings were made on a 7-point likert scale (-3 = 
Negative, 3 = Positive). 
The Q-sort task is a simple sorting exercise.  Participants were first provided with the 
definitions of morality and competence, which were described to them as “psychological 
constructs.”  Then they read the same 36 behavioural episodes again, and chose which of the two 
trait domains that each item best represented.  There was also an option to choose neither 
morality nor competence.  In reality, these were the same items that were created to uniquely 
reflect interactional or procedural fairness.  The expected result was that the items created to 
reflect interactional fairness would be consistently sorted into the morality domain, and the items 
created to reflect procedural fairness would be consistently sorted into the competence domain. 
The Q-sort is a pretest methodology that draws on the concept of substantive validity 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1991).  Substantive validity refers to the degree to which a measure is 
theoretically linked to a certain construct.  Substantive validity contributes to the measure’s 
construct validity (Loevinger, 1957).  If the results of the Q-sort task emerge as expected, there 
will be support for the fact that the interactional and procedural fairness items tapped the relevant 
trait domain of morality and competence, respectively.  Since the theoretical reasoning for our 
hypotheses rests on these two connections, the Q-sort can assist in the development of the main 
study. 
The index of the Q-sort that is employed in the current research is the proportion of 
substantive agreement, psa.  It is defined as the proportion of participants who assign an item to 
its intended category (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991).  In the current research, the criterion for 
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inclusion of an item in the main study was that at least 70% of participants placed the item into 
its intended domain (interactional fairness items into the morality domain, and procedural 
fairness items into the competence domain).   
Results 
The results for the valence ratings are displayed in Table 2.  In contrast to what prior 
literature has suggested, it was the procedural fairness/unfairness items that exhibited slightly 
more extreme ratings of valence, overall.  For unfairness items, the mean ratings of valence were 
lower for procedural items than they were for interactional items (Ms = -2.69 and -2.82, 
respectively).  As well, for the fairness items, the mean ratings for the procedural items were 
higher than the mean ratings for the interactional items (Ms = 1.31 and 0.77, respectively)   
Two t-tests were carried out in order to determine if the interactional valence ratings were 
significantly different from the procedural valence ratings.  For the items that only portrayed 
unfairness, the valence ratings between procedural and interactional unfairness items were not 
significantly different from each other.  A paired t-test for the mean ratings of items of 
procedural unfairness vs. interactional unfairness did not show a significant difference, t(28) = -
1.30, p = .21.  A different outcome was found for items that reflected fairness.  A paired t-test for 
the mean ratings of items of procedural fairness vs. interactional fairness did show a significant 
difference, t(28) = 6.80, p < .01. 
Table 3 shows the results for the Q-sort task.  There were 32 items that were placed into 
the intended domain at least 70% of the time, and this includes all 27 items that met the criteria 
in pilot study 1.   
 Fortunately, only 16 items were required in order to carry out the main study.  Five items 
for each type of fairness and three items for each type of unfairness were required.  The reason 
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for this unique number of items is that the main study of the current research is a replication of a 
study by Kammrath, Ames & Scholer (2007), in which the same number of positive and negative 
items was used.  Therefore, we selected the best 16 items to use in the main study, those that 
were rated as most representative of their respective type of fairness in pilot study 1.  These two 
pilot studies provided us with the tools needed to compare the impression revision processes for 




 As explained in the introduction, the purpose of the main study was to compare revision 
processes for impressions of interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness.  One approach to 
doing this was to measure how much these impressions changed from a first impression to a later 
impression, after more information about the actor was disseminated.  The main study was 
constructed as a replication of the experimental paradigm developed by Kammrath et al. (2007, 
Experiment 3).  In that experiment, participants formed initial impressions of several personality 
traits of an actor.  Subsequently, additional information was provided about the actor, and 
participants’ impressions were once again reported.   
In the current study, participants read a single behavioural episode about a manager in an 
organization, and formed an initial impression of the actor’s interactional or procedural fairness.  
They reported that impression by providing a rating of the fairness of the manager.  
Subsequently, six additional episodes of behavioural information were provided about the same 
manager.  Participants then provided an updated impression of the fairness of the manager in the 
form of another fairness rating.  Within-person changes in each participant’s fairness impressions 
were assessed.   
Two between-subjects factors were experimentally manipulated.  The first was the type 
of fairness information that was given about the manager.  One of either interactional or 
procedural fairness information was provided.  The second factor was the initial behaviour that 
was read by the participant about the manager, which was either fair or unfair.  Finally, 





One hundred four undergraduate students (62 women and 42 men) at the University of 
Waterloo participated in this study for course credit.  Participants were recruited through the 
Psychology Department’s research participant pool.  Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the conditions of the 2 (fairness type: interactional vs. procedural) x 2 (initial behaviour: fair 
vs. unfair) factorial design.   
Materials and Procedure   
Participants were told that they would be reading information about an anonymous 
manager from an organization.  First, they read a single, initial example of managerial behaviour.  
This is where the manipulation occurred.  Participants in the interactional fairness/unfairness 
conditions read a behavioural episode relevant to interactional fairness or unfairness.  Likewise, 
participants in the procedural fairness/unfairness conditions read a behavioural episode in the 
realm of procedural fairness.  The definition of the relevant type of fairness was then provided.  
Participants then gave two ratings of the manager’s relevant type of fairness.  Both items were 
likert-style, and asked for a rating of the manager’s fairness (e.g., for interactional fairness 
conditions, -3 = Very Interactionally Unfair, 3 = Very Interactionally Fair; for procedural 
fairness conditions, -3 = Very Procedurally Unfair, 3 = Very Procedurally Fair).  For each 
participant, the two ratings of fairness were combined to form a 2-item composite.  This 
composite constituted their initial impression of the manager.   
Next, participants read six additional behaviours about the manager.  Across all 
conditions, four of the behaviours were fair and two were unfair.  The order of these six 
behaviours was as follows: fair, unfair, fair, unfair, fair, fair.  It is important to note that 
participants in both interactional conditions – fair and unfair – read the same six behaviours, and 
that these behaviours pertained to interactional fairness/unfairness.  Participants in the two 
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procedural conditions also read the same six behaviours, which pertaining only to procedural 
fairness/unfairness.  After receiving this additional information about the manager, participants 
provided another impression of the relevant type of fairness on the same two items as before.  
And as before, the two items were combined to form a composite score, which represented the 
revised impression.  Finally, participants rated the valence of each of the seven behavioural 
episodes on a seven-point likert scale  (-3 = Negative, 0 = Neutral, 3 = Positive).  The 
participants were then debriefed and thanked.       
Results 
 In order to evaluate the hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (fairness type: interactional vs. 
procedural) x 2 (initial behaviour: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (time of rating: initial vs. revised) ANOVA, 
in which the first two factors were between-subjects, and the third (time of rating: initial vs. 
revised) was within-subjects.  None of the main effects were found to be significant, whether or 
not valence was controlled.  Participant gender did not moderate any of the effects in this 
analysis.  Therefore, gender is not considered further. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that after observing impression-inconsistent behaviour, initial 
impressions of interactional fairness/unfairness will exhibit more revision than initial 
impressions of procedural fairness/unfairness.  Hypothesis 1 thus predicts a significant three-way 
interaction.  A significant three-way interaction was found, F (2,100) = 3.89, p = .05.  The means 
and standard errors for the 3-way interaction are given in Table 5, and plotted visually in Figure 
4.   As can be seen, the results are consistent with prediction in that, in both the fair first-
impression and the unfair first-impression conditions, the rate of change in fairness judgement is 
steeper for interactional fairness than for procedural fairness.  Although the 2x2x2 pattern is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, we further analyzed the simple effects to test Hypothesis 1. More 
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specifically, we conducted two separate 2 (fairness type: interactional vs. procedural) x 2 (time 
of rating: initial vs. revised) ANOVAs, one within the fair-initial impression condition, and 
another within the unfair-initial impression condition. 
The results revealed that, within the fair initial-impression condition, the drop in ratings 
of interactional fairness over time (from M = 1.87 to M = 0.11, see Figure 4) was not 
significantly greater than the drop in ratings of procedural fairness (from M = 2.08 to M = 0.62), 
F(1,51) = 0.57.  This analysis showed only the expected main effect of time, such that ratings 
were more negative at Time 2 vs. Time 1, F(1, 51) = 66.3, p < .01.   
Within the unfair initial-impression condition, there was the expected significant main 
effect of time, such that ratings were more positive at Time 2 vs. Time 1, F(1,49) = 55.31, p < 
.01.  Importantly, we also observed the predicted interaction.  That is, the rate of change in 
fairness impression was significantly greater for interactional fairness (from M = -2.09 to M = -
0.17) than for procedural fairness (from M = -1.67 to M = -0.56), F(1,49) = 4.07, p < .05.     
In summary, Hypothesis 1 was supported for unfair-first impressions:  interactional 
fairness impressions were adjusted “upward” more than procedural fairness perceptions, in the 
face of later impression inconsistent behaviour.  Although the pattern was in line with prediction 
for fair-first impressions, such that interactional fairness impressions were adjusted “downward” 
more than procedural fairness, this interaction was not statistically significant.  It is also 
noteworthy that, in follow up analyses, we statistically controlled for the valence ratings made by 
the participants, and the interaction for unfair-first impressions remained statistically significant.   
 Hypothesis 2 stated that after observing impression-inconsistent information, first 
impressions of fairness would exhibit more revision than first impressions of unfairness, 
regardless of fairness type.  In order to assess this hypothesis, we assessed whether the relevant 
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two-way interaction - initial behaviour x time of rating-emerged out of the primary 2x2x2 
ANOVA referred to earlier.   
Among all of the two-way interactions in the model, the only one that was significant was 
that between initial behaviour and time of rating, F(1, 103) = 121.25, p < .01.  Of course, this 
interaction was not surprising:  the significance here was due to the fact that the slopes of 
impression change were opposite in sign in the fairness-first and unfairness-first conditions. That 
is, over time, participants’ impressions became more negative in the fair-first manager behaviour 
conditions.  In contrast, participants’ impressions became more positive in the unfair-first 
manager behaviour conditions from the initial ratings to the revised ratings.   
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the results showed that first impressions of fairness/unfairness 
exhibited relatively equal amounts of impression revision.  This is illustrated in Figure 5, which 
shows the mean changes for the initial-to-revised impressions of unfairness and fairness, 




 Taken together, the results of these three studies suggest that people think about and 
manage interactional fairness/unfairness impressions differently than they do with procedural 
fairness/unfairness impressions.  This was found to be the case, regardless of whether those 
impressions were of fairness or unfairness.  The results from the main study suggest that first 
impressions of interactional fairness/unfairness are subject to greater amounts of revision in the 
face of impression-inconsistent behaviour than first impressions of procedural 
fairness/unfairness.  Impressions of procedural fairness/unfairness exhibited less revision under 
identical conditions.  It is important to note that these changes were not significantly different, 
and so these effects should be acknowledged as trends.   
Whether the first impression was fair or unfair, interactional impressions showed a 
proclivity toward ongoing, continuous revising as more information about the manager was 
revealed.  For procedural fairness, it was the initial impression that ultimately carried more 
weight.  Significantly less “real-time” impression revising occurred with procedural fairness 
impressions.    
 The logic regarding diagnosticity and maintenance, along with our theoretical 
postulations, were the predominant reasons why Hypothesis 1 received support.  From the 
previous research literature, we knew that humans are both very poor and unconfident in their 
predictions of the consistency of the morality-related behaviours of others.  We also knew that 
they are very adept and confident at predicting the consistency of competence-related behaviours 
(Kunda & Nisbett, 1986a).   
Another way to understand diagnosticity is to think of it as the amount of confidence an 
observer has that an actor’s particular behaviour will be repeated again in the future.  As 
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observers, we have been shown to be confident, accurate estimators of the likelihood that 
observed competence behaviours will be repeated again in the future (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986a; 
Kunda & Nisbett, 1986b).  The objectivity and transparent interpretability of competence 
behaviours are behind this phenomenon.  In contrast, we are inaccurate, unconfident estimators 
of the likelihood that observed morality behaviours will be repeated again in the future.  As can 
be seen in the current research, interpretation of morality-related behaviour is difficult.  As such, 
it makes predicting behaviour in this domain radically more difficult.  Taken together, it is clear 
that morality behaviours are low in diagnosticity, and competence behaviours are high in 
diagnosticity. 
 The results of the Q-Sort task in Pilot Study 2 provided full support for our theoretical 
postulations.  Indeed, the results showed that interactional fairness can be conceptualized as 
mapping onto the morality trait domain, and procedural fairness can be conceptualized as 
mapping onto the competence trait domain.  As expected, the participants consistently sorted the 
interactional fairness items into the morality category, and sorted the procedural fairness items 
into the competence category.  As well, only the items that were most representative of the type 
of fairness for which they were created to reflect (as rated by participants in Study 1) were 
selected for use.   
 The supportive findings from Pilot Study 2 coincided nicely with what was known from 
previous research about the maintenance levels of the morality and competence trait domains.  
Interactional fairness falls within the morality domain.  Morality impressions are higher in 
maintenance and thus are more prone to revision in the face of impression-inconsistent 
information.  Therefore, we reasoned that impressions of interactional fairness would exhibit 
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greater amounts of impression revision when an observer was faced with impression-inconsistent 
behavioural information.  The data in the current study supported our reasoning.   
 Similarly, procedural fairness was found to fall within the competence domain.  Coupling 
this with the established finding that competence impressions are low in maintenance and are 
thus more resistant to revision, we had a basis for predicting that impressions of procedural 
fairness would exhibit less revision under identical conditions.  
 The explanation for the results of the main study comes back to the theoretical 
postulations about the two types of fairness and how they map onto their respective trait 
domains. Interactional fairness falls within the morality trait domain.  The low diagnosticity of 
morality-related behaviours can explain why participants spent considerably more cognitive 
resources on “real-time” revising – or updating – of their interactional fairness impressions as 
they learned new information about the manager.  The difficulty of determining how 
representative an actor’s morality-related behaviour is of his or her relevant underlying trait leads 
the observer to allocate more cognitive resources on “accounting” processes.  Due to the fickle 
relationship between morality behaviours and morality traits, then, people are more willing to 
spend the mental energy keeping tabs on the morality-related actions of others.   
On the contrary, the high diagnosticity of competence-related behaviours explains why 
participants did not need to spend as many cognitive resources revising their impressions of the 
manager’s procedural fairness as new information was learned.  Competence behaviours are 
completely indicative of their relevant underlying traits.  As such, people are more likely to 
allow their initial impressions of fairness to anchor their later judgments for procedural fairness 
impressions as compared to interactional fairness impressions.   
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In Pilot Study 2, participants rated the valence of each of the 36 items.  Results showed 
that, as a group, the items pertaining to procedural fairness/unfairness received slightly more 
extreme ratings of positivity and negativity than items of interactional fairness/unfairness.  
Specifically, procedural fairness items were rated more positively than the interactional fairness 
items, and the procedural unfairness items were rated more negatively than the interactional 
unfairness items.   
This finding in Pilot Study 2 does not confound the results of the main study.  If the 
interactional fairness items had instead been rated more extremely in valence than the procedural 
fairness items, one could argue that the greater amount of impression revision that was seen in 
interactional fairness impressions was due to the fact that the initial impressions of interactional 
fairness had greater starting points to change from, due to their more extreme valence ratings.  
That is, the greater amount of impression revision for interactional impressions that was found in 
the main study could have been partially accounted for by the more extreme ratings of valence of 
the interactional items.  However, it was the procedural fairness items that were rated more 
extremely in valence.  Therefore, valence does not confound the explanation of why impressions 
of interactional fairness/unfairness exhibited greater amounts of revision in the face of 
impression-inconsistent information.     
As stated previously, there had also been a collection of research findings to support the 
notions that negative information is weighted more heavily in impressions than positive 
information (Lind, Kray & Thompson, 2001), and that negative impressions are more resistant to 
revision than positive first impressions (e.g., Ybarra, 2001; Kammrath, Ames & Scholer, 2007).  
Along with Hypothesis 1, then, a main effect of negativity was also expected, such that first 
impressions of unfairness would exhibit less revision than first impressions of fairness, 
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regardless of the type of fairness.  Thus, we proposed a second hypothesis, that after observing 
impression-inconsistent behaviour, first impressions of fairness would exhibit more revision than 
first impressions of unfairness, regardless of fairness type.   
While a significant two-way interaction was found, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
First impressions of fairness did not exhibit more revision than first impressions of unfairness.  
In fact, first impressions of fairness and first impressions of unfairness showed relatively equal 
amounts of impression revision after impression-inconsistent information was observed.   
 This study was not without its limitations.  This can be considered a low impact study 
because since participants were simply reading behavioural information about a manager.  This 
study may have lacked experimental realism.  In the future, a similar study could be carried out 
in which participants observe and rate the fairness of the behaviour of an actual manager.  While 
the manager behaviours were pilot tested to ensure that they were representative of their intended 
type of fairness in the current research, one cannot be certain that the single initial episode of 
managerial behaviour in the main study really evoked an impression of fairness or unfairness 
within the participants.  As well, the main study relied on a single behavioural episode in order to 
create the impression in each condition.  It would have been useful to vary the initial behaviour.  
This way, we could determine if the same effects were found.   
We are still learning about how new behavioural information pertaining to fairness 
becomes integrated into existing impressions of fairness.  To our knowledge, there simply has 
not been any research conducted in this area.  Nor has this type of research been conducted in an 
organizational setting.  This research was carried out with the intention of bridging both of these 
literature gaps.  This paper has allowed us to reach a better understanding of how first 
impressions of the fairness of a manger are or are not revised as an observer learns more about 
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that manager.  We hope that the current research will stimulate subsequent studies of impression 
revision in an organizational setting, because manager fairness clearly matters to employees and 






Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1992). Thin slices of expressive behavior as predictors of 
interpersonal consequences: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 111(2), 256-274.  
Anderson, J. C., & Gerbing, D. W. (1991). Predicting the performance of measures in a 
confirmatory factor analysis with a pretest assessment of their substantive validities. Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 76(5), 732-740.  
Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality. The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 41(3), 258-290.  
Asch, S. E., & Zukier, H. (1984). Thinking about persons. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 46(6), 1230-1240.  
Barling, J., & Phillips, M. (1993). Interactional, formal, and distributive justice in the workplace: 
An exploratory study. Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 127(6), 649-
656.  
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than 
good. Review of General Psychology, 5(4), 323-370.  
Bies, R. J. (2001). International (in)justice: The sacred and the profane. In J. Greenberg, & R. 
Cropanzano (Eds.), Advances in organization justice. (pp. 89-118). Stanford University 
Press. xviii: 284 pp.  
33 
 
Bies, R. J., & Moag, J. S. (1986). Interactional justice: Communication criteria of fairness. In 
Lewicki, R. J., Sheppard, B. H., & Bazerman, B. H. (Eds.). Research on Negotiation in 
Organizations (Vol. 1), 43–55, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Birnbaum, M. H. (1973). Morality judgment: Test of an averaging model with differential 
weights. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 99(3), 395-399.  
Briscoe, M., Woodyard, H., & Shaw, M. (1967). Personality impression change as a function of 
the favorableness of first impressions. Journal of Personality, 35(2), 343-357.  
Cohen-Charash, Y., & Spector, P. E. (2001). The role of justice in organizations: A meta-
analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 86(2), 278-321.  
Colquitt, J. A. (2001). On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of 
a measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(3), 386-400.  
Colquitt, J. A., Conlon, D. E., Wesson, M. J., Porter, C. O. L. H., & Ng, K. Y. (2001). Justice at 
the millenium: A meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(3), 425-425.  
Fiske, S. T., Neuberg, S. L., Beattie, A. E., & Milberg, S. J. (1987). Category-based and 
attribute-based reactions to others: Some informational conditions of stereotyping and 
individuating processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23(5), 399-427.  
Hamilton, D. L., & Zanna, M. P. (1972). Differential weighting of favorable and unfavorable 
attributes in impressions of personality. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 
6(2-3), 204-212.  
34 
 
Holmvall, C. M., & Bobocel, D. R. (2008). What fair procedures say about me: Self-construals 
and reactions to procedural fairness. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 105(2), 147-168.  
Huo, Y. J., Smith, H. J., Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1996). Superordinate identification, 
subgroup identification, and justice concens: Is spearatism the problem; is assimilation the 
answer? Psychological Science, 7(1), 40-45.  
Judd, C. M., James-Hawkins, L., Yzerbyt, V., & Kashima, Y. (2005). Fundamental dimensions 
of social judgment: Understanding the relations between judgments of competence and 
warmth. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 899-913.  
Kammrath, L. K., Ames, D. R., & Scholer, A. A. (2007). Keeping up impressions: Inferential 
rules for impression change across the big five. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
43(3), 450-457.  
Kunda, Z., & Nisbett, R. E. (1986). Prediction and the partial understanding of the law of large 
numbers. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22(4), 339-354.  
Kunda, Z., & Nisbett, R. E. (1986). The psychometrics of everyday life. Cognitive Psychology, 
18(2), 195-224.  




Lind, E. A., Kray, L., & Thompson, L. (2001). Primacy effects in justice judgments: Testing 
predictions from fairness heuristic theory. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 85(2), 189-210.  
Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. New York, NY, 
US: Plenum Press.  
Loevinger, J. (1957). Objective tests as instruments of psychological theory. Psychological 
Reports, 3, 635-694.  
Reeder, G. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1979). A schematic model of dispositional attribution in 
interpersonal perception. Psychological Review, 86(1), 61-79.  
Reeder, G. D., & Coovert, M. D. (1986). Revising an impression of morality. Social Cognition, 
4(1), 1-17.  
Skarlicki, D. P., & Folger, R. (1997). Retaliation in the workplace: The roles of distributive, 
procedural, and interactional justice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82(3), 434-443.  
Sweeney, P. D., & McFarlin, D. B. (1993). Workers' evaluations of the "ends" and the "means": 
An examination of four models of distributive and procedural justice. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55(1), 23-40. Ybarra, O. (2001). When first 
impressions don't last: The role of isolation and adaptation processes in the revision of 





Figure 1  













Figure 3  






















t-statistic,   
p-value 




1: PF (+) No 6.19 5.74 t = -1.70, 
p = .1 
Marginal 
Voice their 
opinion / about 
changes at work 
No 
2: IF (-) Yes 1.58 3.61 t = 7.36,   
p = .000, 
Yes 




3: IF (+) Yes 6.36 5.12 t = -5.12, 
p = .000, 
Yes 




4: PF (-) Yes 3.16 1.84 t = -5.45, 
p = .000, 
Yes 
Not ensure info 




5: IF (-) Yes 2.10 3.16 t = 2.97,   
p = .006, 
Yes 
Disrespectfully / 
not allow them to 
go to conference 
Yes* 
6: IF (+) Yes 5.23 4.58 t = -1.85, 
p = .074, 
Marginal 
Concern and 
sensitivity / death 
in the family 
Yes* 
7: PF (-) Yes 3.39 2.58 t = -2.70, 
p = .011, 
Yes 




8: PF (-) No 3.03 3.45 t = 1.53,   
p = .136, 
No 




9: PF (+) No 5.81 5.39 t = -1.82, 







10: IF (-) Yes 2.06 3.90 t = 6.50,   
p = .000, 
Yes 
Insensitive / not 
willing to discuss 
a salary increase 
Yes 
11: IF (+) Yes 5.32 4.55 t = -2.32, 










12: IF (-) Yes 3.03 3.65 t = 2.21,   
p = .035, 
Yes 
Didn’t explain 
why they couldn’t 
move into new 
office 
Yes 
13: PF (+) Yes 4.61 6.61 t = 9.19,   






14: IF (+) Yes 5.71 5.29 t = -1.82, 






15: PF (-) Yes 2.71 2.58 t = -.349, 
p = .73, 
No 
Did not allow 
appeals / about 
relocation 
No 
16: PF (-) Yes 2.71 2.52 t = -.641, 
p = .527, 
No 
Did not provide 
justification / 
setting own work 
schedules 
No 
17: PF (+) Yes 4.87 6.45 t = 5.87,   
p = .000, 
Yes 




18: PF (+) Yes 4.87 6.52 t = 6.12,   
p = .000, 
Yes 
Used established 




19: IF (-) Yes 1.84 2.84 t = 3.55,   
p = .001, 
Yes 
Disrespectful /  do 
a project that 
H.G. was 
supposed to do 
Yes 
20: PF (-) Yes 2.10 1.81 t = -1.09, 
p = .286, 
No 
Failed to justify a 
decision to fire an 
employee 
No 
21: PF (+) Yes 4.68 6.45 t = 8.03,   
p = .000, 
Yes 
Used accurate 
data / informing 
who gets a pay 
cut 
Yes* 
22: IF (+) Yes 6.19 5.19 t = -4.17, 
p = .000, 
Yes 
Open and honest / 
informing that 
they need to 
improve 
Yes* 
23: PF (-) Yes 3.39 1.77 t = -5.45, 
p = .000, 
Yes 
Failed to collect 
info when doing 
performance evals 
Yes* 
24: PF (+) Yes 4.65 5.71 t = 3.68,   









25: IF (+) Yes 5.58 4.61 t = -3.78, 







26: IF (+) Yes 5.94 4.77 t = -5.89, 




they get no flex 
time schedule 
Yes* 
27: IF (-) Yes 2.03 3.45 t = 4.91,   
p = .000, 
Yes 
Rude / informing 
of the overtime 
they had to work 
Yes* 
28: IF (-) No 2.97 2.65 t = -1.24, 
p = .224, 
No 
Waited until 
Friday / had to 
work Saturday 
No 
29: IF (-) Yes 1.87 3.39 t = 5.05,   
p = .000, 
Yes 
Hurtful remarks / 
informing of no 
bonuses 
Yes 
30: IF (+) Yes 6.07 5.32 t = -2.47, 
p = .019, 
Yes 
Respectful / 
granting time off 
Yes* 
31: PF (-) Yes 3.29 1.87 t = -4.98, 
p = .000, 
Yes 
Didn’t use 
accurate / decide 
vacation 
Yes* 
32: PF (+) Yes 5.42 5.97 t = 1.64,   
p = .111, 
No 
Behaved ethically 
/ correcting error 
No 
33: IF (+) Yes 5.50 4.75 t = -2.02, 






34: IF  (+) Yes 5.90 5.39 t = -1.83, 
p =  .077, 
Marginal 




35: PF (+) Yes 4.81 6.35 t = 6.29,   
p = .000, 
Yes 
Assembled a 
committee / how 
to cut costs 
Yes* 
36: PF (+) No 5.19 4.58 t = -1.98, 
p = .057, 
Marginal 
Allowed them to 




Note.  N = 31; Ratings recoded to a scale from 1-7; PF = Procedural item; IF = Interactional 












PF (-) Failed to go by the book / planning work activities of 
employees 
4.13 
IF (+) Was respectful / sorting out family issues 4.43* 
IF (-) Rude / overtime 3.37* 
PJ (+) Assembled a committee / to cut costs 5.63* 
IF (+) Sincere / no flex-time 3.60* 
IF (-) Disrespectfully / not attend conference 3.37* 
PF (-) Did not use accurate info / deciding vacation times 1.70* 
PF (-) Not willing to change / performance ratings 3.67 
IF (+) Open and honest / need to improve performance 5.77* 
PF (+) Allowed them to have say / salary 5.57 
PF (+) Asked opinions / holiday schedules 3.97 
IF (-) Waited until Friday / come work Saturday 2.00 
PF (+) Impartial and unbiased / allowed to attend a training course 5.83* 
PF (-) No justification / not set own work schedules 1.73 
IF (+) Concern and sensitivity / death in the family 3.33* 
PF (+) Followed a point system / determining bonuses 6.40* 
PF (+) Behaved ethically / correcting a computer error 3.60 
IF (+) Concern and sensitivity / informing of lay-off 5.70 
PF (+) Methodically followed / harassment claim  4.13* 
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PF (-) Failed to collect info / performance evaluations 3.97* 
IF (+) Non-verbal concern / informing about promotions 5.40 
IF (-) Improper and harmful / denying request for vacation time 1.67* 
IF (+) Sincere / informing of demotion 5.53 
IF (+) Respectful / explaining budget cuts 3.93 
PF (-) Failed to justify decision / to fire employee 1.37 
IF (-) Improper and hurtful / not to give bonuses 3.60 
PF (+) Encouraged to voice opinion / about changes at work  6.27 
IF (+) Non-verbal concern / informing them lost a sales competition 3.90* 
IF (-) Insensitive / wasn’t willing to discuss a salary increase 2.57 
PF (+) Decided based on data / to decide on who received a pay cut 5.63* 
IF (-) Did not explain / why employee couldn’t move into the new 
office 
2.50 
IF (-) Disrespectfully / not explain why they had to do project that 
manager was to do 
3.50 
PF (-) Did not allow appeals / about relocation 1.53 
IF (+) Open & honest / explaining process used to make pay-cuts 6.10 
PF (+) Consistent / in deciding duties 6.13 
PF (-) Did not take relevant info into account / when deciding on 
budget cuts 
3.40* 
Note. N = 30; PF = Procedural item; IF = Interactional item; + = fairness item; - = unfairness 
item; * = item was selected for use in the main study
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Label psa Met the 
70% 
criteria? 
PF (-) Competence (-) Failed to go by the book / planning work 
activities of employees 
28/30 Yes 
IF (+) Morality (+) Was respectful / sorting out family issues 29/30 Yes* 
IF (-) Morality (-) Rude / overtime 30/30 Yes* 
PJ (+) Competence (+) Assembled a committee / to cut costs 26/30 Yes* IF Morality (+) Sincere / no fl x-time 8
IF (-) Morality (-) Disrespectfully / not attend conference 28/30 Yes* 
PF (-) Competence (-) Did not use accurate info / deciding 
vacation times 
20/30 Yes* 
PF (-) Competence (-) Not willing to change / performance 
ratings 
12/30 No 
IF (+) Morality (+) Open and honest / need to improve 
performance 
21/30 Yes* 
PF (+) Competence (+) Allowed them to have say / salary 18/30 No 
PF (+) Competence (+) Asked opinions / holiday schedules 17/30 No 
IF (-) Morality (-) Waited until Friday / come work 
Saturday 
23/30 Yes 
PF (+) Competence (+) Impartial and unbiased / allowed to 
attend a training course 
27/30 Yes* 
PF (-) Competence (-) No justification / not set own work 
schedules 
21/30 Yes 
IF (+) Morality (+) Concern and sensitivity / death in the 
family 
24/30 Yes* 
PF (+) Competence (+) Followed a point system / determining 
bonuses 
20/30 Yes* 
PF (-) Competence (-) Behaved ethically / correcting a 
computer error 
19/30 No 
IF (+) Morality (+) Concern and sensitivity / informing of 
lay-off 
25/30 Yes 
PF (+) Competence (+) Methodically followed / harassment 
claim  
27/30 Yes* 





IF (+) Morality (+) Non-verbal concern / informing about 
promotions 
27/30 Yes 
IF (-) Morality (-) Improper and hurtful / denying request 
for vacation time 
28/30 Yes* 
IF (-) Morality (+) Sincere / informing of demotion 25/30 Yes 
IF (-) Morality (+) Respectful / explaining budget cuts 24/30 Yes 
PF (-) Competence (-) Failed to justify decision / to fire 
employee 
22/30 Yes 
IF (-) Morality (-) Improper and hurtful / not to give 
bonuses 
20/30 Yes 
PF (+) Competence (+) Encouraged to voice opinion / about 
changes at work  
23/30 Yes 
IF (+) Morality (+) Non-verbal concern / informing them 
that they lost a sales competition 
29/30 Yes* 
IF (-) Morality (-) Insensitive / wasn’t willing to discuss a 
salary increase 
22/30 Yes 
PF (+) Competence (+) Decided based on data / to decide on 
who received a pay cut 
26/30 Yes* 
IF (-) Morality (-) Did not explain / why employee couldn’t 
move into the new office 
22/30 Yes 
IF (-) Morality (-) Disrespectfully / not explain why they 
had to do project that manager was to do 
25/30 Yes 
PF (-) Competence (-) Did not allow appeals / about relocation 22/30 Yes 
IF (+) Morality (+) Open & honest / explaining process used 
to make pay-cuts 
21/30 Yes 
PF (+) Competence (+) Consistent / in deciding duties 21/30 Yes 
PF (-) Competence (-) Did not take relevant info into account / 
when deciding on budget cuts 
28/30 Yes* 
Note. N = 30; PF = Procedural item; IF = Interactional item; + = fairness item; - = unfairness 






Table 4  
Number of Items Selected for Use in the Main Study 
 Procedural Interactional 
Fair 5 5 







Descriptive Statistics  
Fair First Impressions 
  Interactional Fairness   Procedural Fairness 
Time  n M SE n M SE 
Initial 27 1.87 0.19 26 2.08 0.19 
Revised 27 0.11 0.26 26 0.62 0.26 
Unfair First Impressions 
  Interactional Fairness   Procedural Fairness 
Time  n M SE n M SE 
Initial 27 -2.09 0.19 24 -1.67 0.20 






Figure 4  
Initial and Revised Ratings of Fairness, within each of the Fair First Impression and Unfair 
First Impression Conditions. 
























































Figure 5  
Initial and Revised Ratings of Fair and Unfair First Impressions 
Initial Impressions of Unfairness
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